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The role of the civil servant in modern democracies is increasingly complex due to multi-
ple and co-existing forms of democratic governance. Civil servants need to balance be-
tween traditional bureaucratic norms ensuring a rule-governed public administration 
where they represent neutral competencies within the political system, while they at the 
same time must ensure efficiency in the public sector, interact with various stakeholders 
and citizens, and ensure the loyal implementation of the will of elected politicians. In the 
wake of several Danish political scandals involving both ministers and civil servants, the 
so called Bo Smith Commission was established in order to examine and discuss the 
current norms and practices of the civil service. In this article we draw on a survey con-
ducted by the Bo Smith Commission in 2015 including nearly 4.000 lower-ranking civil 
servants. Through an in-depth study of the 554 responses in the open category, we uncov-
er how functional politicization is manifested in Danish state administration among low-
er-ranking civil servants. The study, thus, uncovers in detail the characteristics of func-
tional politicization and investigates the coping strategies of lower-ranking civil servants, 




Civil servants in western democracies are part of a public sector that is faced 
with numerous criteria for success. The various criteria for success have been 
linked to the emergence of different forms of governance in western democra-
cies that exist side by side, creating a complex structure of expectation for civil 
servants. Civil servants need to balance between traditional bureaucratic norms 
ensuring a rule-governed public administration where they represent neutral 
competencies within the political system, while at the same time they must en-
sure efficiency in the public sector, interact with a range of stakeholders and 
citizens, and ensure the implementation of the will of elected politicians. Some  
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sections of the literature has described the civil servants as boundary spanners to 
stress their role as facilitators, brokers, diplomats or ‘go-betweens’, rather than 
operating within a chain of command (Hood & Lodge, 2006: 96). 
The multifaceted role of civil servants is by no means a new phenomenon 
and may be associated with the fact that civil servants work in a political system, 
but without a political mandate. The dichotomy of politics and administration 
has occupied scholars of public administration for centuries (Wilson, 1887; We-
ber 1980). In the ideal type of bureaucracy as described by Weber (1980), the 
neutral competence of the civil service is central and the distinction between 
politics and administration upheld as an ideal. Most scholars, however, agree 
that it is impossible to obtain a clear-cut distinction between politics and admin-
istration (Peters & Pierre, 2004, Hood & Lodge, 2006). The dichotomy, though, 
still pertains and keeps reoccurring in studies on public administration, just as 
the ideal of neutral competencies still applies when the subject relates to civil 
servants, perhaps because they do not hold a political mandate. At the same time, 
we are seeing an increasing demand for political responsiveness, in order for the 
civil service to serve the elected politicians and their aims. Jon Pierre describes 
this classic dilemma in the following way:  
 
A civil service which becomes overtly politicised runs the risk of be-
ing viewed as merely the administrative instrument of the govern-
ment of the day with limited legality and integrity, something which 
may lead to a decreasing legitimacy in the public eye. A public sector 
governed strictly by legal and regulatory frameworks, on the other 
hand, may indirectly become an obstacle to political change as pro-
moted by the political elite, in which case the civil service will be-
come perceived as rigid, self-serving, bureaucratic, and elitist (Pierre, 
2014: 42-43). 
 
Pierre’s view is supported by Grønnegård, Wang and Opstrup (2016) when they 
state that there are two types of risk connected to the organisation of ministries 
and thereby two types of problematic politicisation. The first is the risk of a 
politicising bureaucracy reducing the minister to a puppet of a powerful civil 
service pursuing its own ends. The second is the risk of a bureaucracy that is so 
politically responsive to the minister that it results in a violation of civil servant 
norms embedded in the Rechtsstaat. Politicisation is thus a double-edged sword 
in modern bureaucracies, since it is regarded as a necessity as well as a danger. 
In recent years, a number of scandals have reached the Danish news media 
involving both ministers and civil servants and the relationship between the two. 
The scandals are numerous and quite different both regarding their content as 
well as the consequences for the parties involved (Koch & Knudsen, 2014). 
However, the scandals may all be seen as related to the aforementioned classic 
dilemma in public administration, the dilemma of politicisation. 





We have studied dilemmas of politicisation and the coping strategies applied 
by civil servants in Danish central government. In this article, we thus contribute 
to the ongoing public and scholarly debate on politicisation and the way in which 
civil servants cope with dilemmas related to politicisation. By politicisation, we 
mean functional politicisation, which refers to the potential political role of civil 
servants through their behaviour. Our study thus withdraws from an analysis of 
formal politicisation, which relates to the recruitment and promotion of civil 
servants (Peters, 2013: 16-19).  
Much of the literature on politicisation focuses on the executive and mana-
gerial level in the public sector, and thus on the relationship between top civil 
servants and politicians – and not on the lower-ranking civil servants (Peters & 
Pierre, 2005; Hood & Lodge, 2006, Rhodes, 2011). However, in this article we 
will focus on lower-ranking civil servants in order to illustrate how functional 
politicisation penetrates the entire public sector organisation and is not just a 
matter for higher-ranking civil servants.  
Our research question is: In what specific ways does functional politicisation 
manifest itself among lower ranking civil servants in Danish central government, 
and which coping strategies are developed in dilemma situations? 
Theoretically, we draw on an interpretative approach to the study of Public 
Administration (Bevir, Rhodes and Weller 2003, Bevir & Rhodes 2006, 2010; 
Bevir 2004, 2011; Rhodes, 2011). In this theory, institutions are characterised by 
contingencies and internal conflicts, which leave room for interpretation by 
individuals. The interpretative approach states that individuals’ interpretations 
may draw on different and sometimes conflicting traditions and narratives. Em-
bedded in the interpretative approach is thus a focus on potential dilemma situa-
tions in political administrative organisations, as well as for the individual civil 
servant. Coping strategies within this approach are associated with various forms 
of internal justifications related to the attempt to create meaning of one’s role 
and behaviour in the organisation. We thus investigate the norms and coping 
strategies of civil servants in dilemma situations in Danish central government. 
With regard to the concept of politicisation, we draw on scholars such as Mulgan 
2008; Peters 2013; Verhey 2013; and Hustedt & Salomonsen 2014).  
Empirically, our article is based on unique data from a survey including al-
most 4,000 lower-ranking civil servants from the state administration in Den-
mark. Our study focuses on the responses in the open category of the survey, 
where a total number of 554 civil servants have added qualitative comments to 
hypothetical civil servant dilemmas to which they were introduced in the survey.  
First, we present our theoretical framework for the analysis. We introduce in 
more detail the theories on politicisation and explain to which specific part of the 
politicisation concept our study contribute. We then unfold the interpretative 
approach to the study of public administration, which constitutes the theoretical 
framework for our analysis. Second, we provide some contextual background for 
the Danish case. We do so by introducing some of the most predominant scan-
dals during the time of the empirical survey on the one hand, and describe the 
legal norms related to the role of the civil servant on the other hand. The latter is 






done through a presentation of the recently published Codex VII, which dictates 
the current legal norms of the role of the civil service in Denmark. Since codex 
VII includes recommended coping strategies for civil servants, we unfold these 
strategies and relate them to Hirschman’s classical concepts of exit, voice and 
loyalty. Third, we introduce our empirical data material and the methods that we 
have used when analysing our material, before we, fourth, present our analysis 
on politicisation in Danish central government. In the analysis, we investigate 
how lower-ranking civil servants interpret their own role in relation to politicisa-
tion and the coping strategies they apply in order to create meaningful actions. 
Finally, we conclude the article by summing up the results from our analysis.  
 
Politicisation and the interpretative approach to the study of it 
The discussions on politicisation are related to the fact that all bureaucracies in 
democratic states are facing the same problem, namely how to insure that the 
civil service is working loyally for the democratic legitimate government, while 
at the same time securing respect of constitutional principles and rule of law 
(Verhey, 2013: 37; Smith and Grønnegård, 2016). The concept of politicisation 
refers to the relationship between politicians and civil servants and particularly 
to the political control over bureaucracy (Hustedt and Salomonsen, 2014). Vari-
ous forms of politicisation can be seen as different modes of ensuring political 
responsiveness, as the term ‘political responsiveness’ refers to the readiness of 
public servants to do what government ministers want (Mulgan, 2008: 345).  
In the literature on politicisation, two overall traditions can be identified 
(Husted & Salomonsen 2014). One school of thought named ‘formal politicisa-
tion’ addresses politicisation as a matter of recruitment, that is, different ways of 
politicising the recruitment of the civil service (se for example Peters & Pierre 
2004). The other tradition addresses politicisation as the behaviour of the civil 
servants, which may be named ‘functional politicisation’ (Husted & Salomonsen 
2014: 750). It is the latter we use in this article. 
The functional politicisation strengthens the political responsiveness by in-
cluding political relevant aspects in the work of the administration. A key ele-
ment in functional politicisation is the provision of political-tactical advice 
where familiarity with the political game is to be expected of the bureaucracy in 
addition to their neutral competencies. Thus, the functional politicisation ensures 
that the bureaucracy can assist the minister in avoiding political risky situations 
(Hustedt and Salomonsen, 2014) 
Even though the functional politicisation is generally accepted to be a neces-
sary and legitimate element in political responsive bureaucracies, it is neverthe-
less also emphasised that the loyalty of the permanent civil service needs to 
reflect a so-called ‘constrained partisanship’ (Mulgan, 2008: 348), that is, the 
loyalty granted to the government should not be pure partisan advice. Hereby it 
is indicated that the prevalence of functional politicisation – at least in theory – 
can be too high. 





In order to capture the functional politicisation in the Danish central gov-
ernment, we employ an interpretative approach to the study of public admin-
istration (Bevir & Rhodes, 2004, Rhodes, 2011, Bevir 2011). In this perspective, 
the state is seen as a cultural practice. The state is not a pre-existing causal struc-
ture understood independently of people’s beliefs and practices (Bevir, 2011: 
192). Thus, the interpretative approach suggests that social scientists need to do 
empirical work in order to investigate which beliefs and desires people actually 
hold in a given case (Bevir, 2011: 191). 
Importantly, institutions are characterised by various narratives and tradi-
tions people can draw on in their attempt to create meaning and justify their own 
actions. Thus, these actions can be explained and understood through an analysis 
of the beliefs that actors inherit from various traditions. Actors in the same or-
ganisational unit may hold similar beliefs, but it is also possible that their beliefs 
differ and/or conflict. Hence, the interpretative approach is a decentered theory, 
suggesting that actors may draw on different traditions in order to construct 
different narratives about the world, their place in it, and their interests and val-
ues (Bevir, 2011: 192).  Consequently, conflicts and dilemmas are an integral 
part of this theoretical approach, since institutions in modern democratic states 
are situated in contexts with competing narratives (Poulsen 2009). Instead of 
seeing institutions with operating rules and procedures that govern the action of 
the individuals, institutions are characterised by contingencies and internal con-
flicts leaving room for interpretation by the individuals (Rhodes, 2011: 3-4). 
Rules are always open to interpretation; therefore, we need to study the beliefs 
and practices of civil servants. Thus, the interpretative approach concentrates 
equally on the practices and beliefs of actors and the narratives and traditions 
that provide the context and historical background to the relevant beliefs and 
actions (Bevir, 2011: 191). In our analysis of coping strategies, we have also 
chosen to include the classical concepts of exit, voice and loyalty as introduced 
by Hirschman (1971). These concepts become relevant since they may be seen 
as penetrating the recently published Codex VII. Civil servants are required to 
raise voice and put their foot down in case of illegal actions and they are obliged 
to act loyally towards the minister.  In our analysis of coping strategies, we thus 
unfold civil servants internal justifications in relation to exit, voice and loyalty.    
Consequently, the empirical analysis will focus on: 
 
• Civil servants’ beliefs regarding politicization 
• Civil servants’ coping strategies regarding politicization seen 
through the lens of exit, voice and loyalty 
 
Before we turn to the empirical analysis of the answers in the open category, we 
will provide a short background for the Danish case and unfold the relevant 
scandals as well as describe the current formal status of civil servants norms as 
described in Codex VII (2015). 
 






Danish central government and recent scandals 
The Danish civil service is a classic merit bureaucracy with neutrality as an 
essential value, as civil servants are not replaced when a new government takes 
power (Betænkning 1354/1998, Betænkning 1443/2004 and Betænkning 
1537/2013). Even though the permanent civil service comprises the predominant 
part of the state administration, there is also a small group of special advisers. 
These special advisers (one or two for each minister depending on the field of 
responsibility) are recruited politically and their employment expires when a 
new government comes into office. However, in light of an increasing demand 
for political-tactical advice and the small number of special advisers, the merit 
bureaucrats largely handle policy-oriented issues and assist in strategic advice 
(Bo Smith-udvalget, 2015; Christiansen et al. 2016). 
The Bo Smith-Commission was established in the light of several problem-
atic cases (“scandals”) which have been uncovered in the Danish Central gov-
ernment recent years. Although the scandals differ in substance and consequenc-
es for the involved parties, many of them are evolving around the same theme: 
the balance between neutral competencies and political responsiveness among 
civil servants. Hence, we will now briefly present the themes and conclusions of 
three of the most significant cases at the time of the survey. 
 
The tax scandal 
Firstly, we will mention a spectacular case concerning the determination of tax 
payment for a prominent MP and her husband, namely the then leader of the 
opposition and future prime minister, the social democrat Helle Thorning 
Schmidt (Justitsministeriet, 2014b). The affair started by a rumour that the cou-
ple was guilty in tax evasion because of false information on the length of the 
husbands stay in Denmark (which was a crucial element in determining whether 
he was liable to pay tax in Denmark). Because of the rumour, the couple’s per-
sonal case on tax calculation was brought up in the tax administration for recon-
sideration. In the autumn of 2010, the regional tax authority reached a final deci-
sion in the case confirming the existing tax calculation: No tax evasion had taken 
place.  
However, nearly a year after – in the midst of the general election campaign 
– the complete individual tax decision (including confidential information) was 
published in the tabloid leading to the obvious conclusion that someone must 
have leaked the document. Moreover, it came out that the political and adminis-
trative top has been deeply involved in meetings and discussion on the concrete 
case handling, although this was not a part of their authority. Serious suspicion 
of misuse of power arose, as the crucial question was whether members of the 
government in cooperation with top civil servants had tried to influence the indi-
vidual decision in the hope of damaging Helle Thorning’s reputation and thereby 
reducing her chances to win the general election. The scandal resulted in the 
dismissal of the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry and the establishment of a 





legal commission of inquiry which was working at the time of the survey and 
was about to publish their final report on the case. 
 
The stateless-gate 
Secondly, we will mention another significant case, namely the ‘stateless gate’ 
(Justitsministeriet, 2015). The affair started when the press uncovered that state-
less Palestinians for years have been subject to illegal administration. The Dan-
ish Immigration Service (a government agency under the Ministry of Integra-
tion) has wrongfully denied citizenship to a number of stateless Palestinians, in 
spite of the fact that international law with binding force for Denmark (especial-
ly the 1961 UN convention on the reduction of Statelessness) determined a right 
to citizenship in these specific situations. The unresolved questions were among 
other things how the civil service was able to neglect the relevant international 
law for so long time, if this was an intentional act, and if the minister or the civil 
service was to blame. Another critical aspect was several examples of lack of 
information and misinformation of the Parliament both generally and when an-
swering specific questions from MPs concerning the matter. Hence, the stateless 
gate actualised the crucial question when the civil servants are obliged to put 
his/her foot down in order to ensure legality and rule of law. The course of 
events had already forced the minister to resign. 
 
The emergency lie 
Third and lastly, it is worth mentioning the case concerning the ‘emergency lie’, 
which attracted much attention in many respects. This political scandal was 
about a planned visit for a parliamentary Committee to “Christiania”, a special 
neighbourhood of Copenhagen established in 1971 by a group of hippies, and 
known for its autonomous inhabitants’ different way of life. However, Christia-
nia has also been a source of ongoing controversy, especially because of illegal 
drug dealing in the open and suspicion of criminal gang activities. The planned 
visit for the MP’s was cancelled with reference to an explanation, which turned 
out to be a false one.  
As it is a central element in the Danish constitutional and administrative sys-
tem that a minister has an obligation to speak truth to the Parliament, this was 
indeed a very serious situation, as the lie was indisputable. The minister was 
forced to resign and the Permanent Secretary and another top civil servant were 
taken off duty, and legal procedures against the civil servants were initiated. 
They have both assisted in constructing the lie and disseminating it to the par-
liament. However, the case took a surprising turn, when the disciplinary pro-
ceedings came to an ending. The two involved top civil servants were acquitted 
of the charge of disciplinary offense, as the disciplinary court introduced a new 
concept, namely the “emergency lie” (Justitsministeriet, 2014a). The civil ser-
vice and the minister had explained that the true reasons for cancelling the visit 
had to do with national security and resources, as the security situation at that 
time and place was unstable and therefore required disproportionally use of 
police and intelligence resources if the visit was carried out. In their opinion, this 






real explanation was not possible to disseminate to the Parliamentary Commit-
tee, as it concerned matters of confidentiality. This explanation accepted the 
disciplinary court as a legitimate excuse for telling a lie to the parliament. 
However, this rubber-stamp of misinformation caused an outcry in the Dan-
ish Parliament as well as in the public debate. There was a consensus that the 
newly established interpretation of the Danish law on ministerial accountability 
was indefensible. Moreover, the judgement on emergency resulted in a blurred 
state of the law and made it much more complicated for civil servants to navi-
gate when assisting the minister.  
To sum up, these three cases in different ways illustrate problems and di-
lemmas in the relationship between the minister and the civil service and seen 
together they bring up the question how civil servants apply different coping 
strategies in situations where they need to prioritise between conflicting norms.  
 
Codex VII 
In connection to the release of the report from the Bo Smith Committee, the 
Danish Ministry of Finance published a so-called “codex” or code of conduct for 
civil servants in the state administration as well as in the municipalities (Finans-
ministeriet, 2015). The timing of the code of conduct was not coincidental. Even 
though the Bo Smith Committee and the government formally were acting inde-
pendently, the Ministry of Finance took advantage of the opportunity to present a 
codex, which could address the problems pointed out in the Bo Smith Commit-
tee. Hence, the codex was released at the very same press conference where the 
Bo Smith Committee presented their work and released their report. Moreover, 
the codex from the Ministry of Finance is published as an appendix to the Bo 
Smith Report itself. Overall giving the impression of the codex being the obvi-
ous answer to the current dilemmas for the civil service. 
It is important to bear in mind, however, that the codex is not representing a 
change or reform, as it was primarily a recapitulation of the existing state of the 
law with the addition of some supplementary comments. Nevertheless, the codex 
is crucial because it is seen as an important tool in handling civil servant dilem-
mas. The Minister of Finance as well as Bo Smith himself emphasised the vital 
importance of teaching and educating the (lower ranking) civil servants in the 
codex, and the major part of the departments and agencies of the central gov-
ernment have consequently accomplished internal courses and working sessions 
on civil servant norms based on the codex VII.  
The norms were presented under the following headlines: (1) Legality, (2) 
truthfulness, (3) professionalism, (4) development and cooperation, (5) loyalty 
and obedience, (6) openness about mistakes and (7) party political neutrality. In 
addition to presenting and specifying these classical norms, the recurring theme 
in the codex was how to handle the unavoidable dilemma when the norms col-
lide. According to the codex and well established jurisprudence, the formal an-
swer is the following: If you as a civil servant are ordered by your superior to 
carry out unlawful actions or disseminate incorrect information, you are obliged 
to put your foot down and say no, at least if the unlawfulness seems to be obvi-





ous. Hence, it is an explicit focal point of the legal framework as well as the 
codex and the fictitious dilemmas presented in the survey that the individual 
civil servant in some circumstances has to voice. 
On that background, we have found it beneficial to draw on Hirschman’s 
classic concept of exit, voice and loyalty stemming from how individuals may 
act in case of discontent. We decided to include these three categories based on 
the Danish context, since a central part of the codex is the idea that civil servants 
should “put his or her foot down” refusing to carry out a political order that is 
against central norms. Applying the concepts of exit, voice and loyalty is intend-
ed as follows: Firstly, the idea of putting one’s foot down may be seen as equiva-
lent to the ‘voice’ as coping strategy. According to the codex and the survey, the 
civil servant sometimes needs to “warn the minister”, “put one’s foot down” or 
“account for consideration”, in other words voice the problems in a very explicit 
way. Secondly, ‘exit’ as coping strategy is also prevalent, though in a more sub-
tle way. On the one hand, exit is not a relevant option because quitting your job 
is not explicitly mentioned in the codex nor actually used by the respondents in 
the survey as they are still occupied as civil servants. On the other hand, howev-
er, the “exit” option seems to be a reoccurring frame of reference when the re-
spondents reflect on their role as civil servants and their behaviour. Exit serves 
as a reflecting wall in the light of which the civil servant is considering his/her 
coping strategies, for example when a respondent states “As a rule, I will always 
do what my superior asks me to, because I don’t want to lose my job”. Third and 
lastly, loyalty is indeed a predominant norm when we look at codex VII. Civil 
servants are supposed to act loyally and not autonomously; this is both consid-
ered as a kind of basic assumption for the neutral Danish civil service but also 
expressed in the explicit norm of loyalty and obedience determining that the civil 
servant as a rule is obliged to obey the orders of his/her superior. 
 
Data material and methods 
In the following, first, we present the data material that forms the basis of our 
empirical analysis. Second, we introduce some methodological reflections in line 




The empirical analysis in this article is based on the data from the ‘open catego-
ry’ in a survey conducted by the Bo Smith Commission in 2015. The Bo Smith 
commission was established in 2014 by DJØF, a Danish union that represents 
academics with a Master’s degree in law, economics, social science, administra-
tion etc. and thereby represents most civil servants in the state administration. 
The members of the Commission were appointed by DJØF and were a group of 
politicians, top civil servants, experts and media representatives. The establish-
ment was a reaction to the before mentioned, numerous, political scandals in 
Denmark. The purpose of the Commission was, first, to shed light on the rela-






tionship between the civil service and other stakeholders and illustrate how the 
civil servants handle their responsibilities, and secondly, to describe the princi-
ples and norms for the civil servants and evaluate whether new norms or other 
initiatives should be introduced in the Danish political system. 
For that purpose, the Bo Smith Commission conducted a survey in 2015 in-
volving civil servants from the state administration in Denmark. The sample 
consists of a total amount of 3.795 civil servants from six different ministries, 
namely the Ministry of Employment, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Food, 
Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Social Affairs and Ministry of Interior and 
Economic Affairs. In the six selected ministries were included respondents from 
the departments as well as from subordinated agencies with tasks involving 
policy advice of the minister. All respondents were promised anonymity and the 
results were not to be reported from single workplaces. It is worth noticing that 
the survey concentrated on the civil servants on the lower levels of the hierarchy 
and thus excludes the chief executives of the organisations. 
The survey was designed as a questionnaire using the vignette technique in 
order to study the professional norms of the civil service. The respondents were 
introduced to seven hypothetical situations describing various civil servants 
dilemmas. Each dilemma represents conflicts between different core values such 
as legality, professional competency and truth on the one hand and obedience, 
loyalty and political responsiveness on the other hand. After each vignette, the 
respondents were asked if they would assist in the problematic action. The re-
spondents were to indicate their supposed action by choosing one out of four 
alternatives; a) Yes, without reservations b) Yes, but I’ll raise my con-
cerns/reservations to my superior c) Only after a direct order, and I’ll in definite 
terms warn my superior d) No, I’ll definitely put my foot down and refuse to 
assist. 
The introducing text to the open category was as follows: “In the above 
questions you have been asked to indicate your judgement of some civil servant 
dilemmas. If you have some supplementary comments to your responds or any 
other comments, you can add them here (Your comments are not to be included 
in the anonymised report which will be handed over to the management and the 
employees)”. A total amount of 554 civil servants chose to add comments in the 
open category equalling upwards of 20 percent of all respondents. 
Our data set is, thus, limited, when it comes to the prevalence of politicisa-
tion in Danish state administration. However, our study is not a quantitative 
study. We are not able to conclude how many of the civil servants that experi-
ence politicisation, nor the number of civil servants using different coping strat-
egies. Rather we use the qualitative data material to shed light on the concept of 
politicisation as it is experienced in every-day work life in a modern central 
administration. Through detailed examples of politicisation and various coping 
strategies, we are able to investigate what politicisation actually means, how it 
challenges the role of civil servants in every-day practices, and, thus, how politi-
cisation is experienced and dealt with by the civil servants.  





This data material from the open category constitutes the basis of our empir-
ical analysis. The described context of our data seems to imply a certain framing 
effect because the vignettes have established a dilemma based and conflictual 
setting for the respondents’ reflections on their behaviour as civil servants. Pre-
sumably, this tends to affect the answers in the open category, which therefore 
not necessarily create a fair picture of the everyday life of a typical civil servant. 
However, in this article we focus explicitly on the dilemma situations with a 
special view to conflicting norms and coping strategies when the demand for 
political responsiveness compromises classical norms integrated in the 
Rechtsstaat. For that purpose, the conflict-oriented framing of the data is not a 
disadvantage, quite the reverse. 
 
Methodological approach 
We conduct a qualitative investigation of politicisation among lower-ranking 
civil servants in the Danish central government. Our focus is on the meaning of 
politicisation as it is understood and described by civil servants, and on the cop-
ing strategies, they employ.  Although theories on public administration and the 
contemporary scandals in Denmark provides us with examples of narratives on 
civil servants’ norms in relation to politicisation, we try to conduct our empirical 
investigation as openly as possible.  
Thus, our methodological approach is inspired by constructivist grounded 
theory analysis, when it comes to the initial analysis of data material (see Char-
maz 2000, 2006; Charmaz and Belgrave 2012). The grounded theory approach to 
data analysis may be useful in connection to our interpretative theoretical ap-
proach, since it “explicitly provides an interpretative portrayal of the studied 
world, not an exact picture of it” (Charmaz & Belgrave, 2012: 349). The task of 
the researcher is to learn respondents’ implicit meanings of their experiences to 
build a conceptual analysis of them (ibid.). According to this methodological 
approach, coding is the pivotal first analytic step that moves the researcher from 
description towards conceptualising that description. Coding requires close at-
tention to the data. However, the codes reflect the researchers’ interests and 
perspectives (Charmaz & Belgrave, 2012: 355). Hence, it is not a purely induc-
tive coding of the data material, which we have carried out. Our coding stems 
from our theoretical approach and has a focus on the meaning of politicisation 
and coping strategies as internal justifications in relation to exit, voice and loyal-
ty. Where objectivist grounded theorists assume that they discover what is hap-
pening in the data, the constructivist grounded theorists acknowledge that they 
define what is happening in the data (Charmaz & Belgrave, 2012: 355-356).  
Thus, we are aware that we look specifically after descriptions of politicisa-
tion, the way it is ascribed meaning by the civil servants and ways in which they 
cope with that politicisation in their described practices. Having said that, we 
have tried to maintain an openness to the concept of politicisation and the asso-
ciated coping strategies in dilemma situations. Accordingly, our first read 
through the 554 civil servant comments in the open category of the survey, was 
an intensive study of all types of meanings related to their work in the State 






administration. Our initial read through showed us that internal justifications was 
part of the civil servants coping strategies. A large number of respondents used 
the open category to reflect upon their own actions in case of a dilemma, just as 
they used the open category to justify these actions. The first read through also 
pointed to hierarchy as a central phenomenon when we were to understand polit-
icisation and the civil servants’ coping strategies. Consequently, during our se-
cond read through, we focused on the following three dimensions, which derived 
from our theoretical framework and our initial read through of the material.  
 
• Civil servants’ beliefs regarding politicization 
• Civil servants’ coping strategies regarding politicization related to 
the concept of exit, voice and loyalty 
• The meaning of hierarchy in relation to beliefs and coping  
strategies 
 
In relation to the first dimension, civil servants’ beliefs regarding politicisation, 
we ask how they interpret politicisation through an analysis of their perceptions 
of politicisation, including whether politicisation is regarded as legitimate and/or 
illegitimate, and whether it differs from situation to situation; and more generally 
how civil servants explain and ascribe meaning to politicisation. In relation to 
the second dimension, civil servants’ coping strategies, we investigate how civil 
servants create meaning through internal justifications related to the aforemen-
tioned concepts of exit, voice and loyalty.   
Finally, we investigated the role of hierarchy in relation to mechanisms of 
politicisation and coping strategies. Hierarchy, as a phenomenon, proved to be 
an important variable in order to understand how lower-ranking civil servants 
interpreted politicisation and the coping strategies that they applied. We now 
turn to the analysis, where we begin with the overall interpretation of politicisa-
tion as it is interpreted in the every-day life in the civil service. 
 
Politicisation in Danish central government 
There is no doubt that functional politicisation is a part of the every-day life in 
the central government among lower ranking civil servants. A civil servant 
states, “It’s a constant balance between politics and professional norms”. An-
other civil servant explains how politicisation has become part of the organisa-
tion’s use of language. He says, “In our organisation we talk about that the 
system must be able to handle ‘whole cases’, meaning that we need to handle 
both professional and political aspects of any given case.”. The political aspects 
of the work are, thus, an integral part of the work carried out in the administra-
tion. In the following, we will investigate in more detail (a) how politicisation is 
interpreted by civil servants, including how politicisation is part of the organisa-
tional culture in the state administration today, (b) if we can identify an intensi-
fied politicisation or not as it is experienced by the civil servants and (c) how the 
civil servants cope with dilemmas associated with politicisation. 






Interpretations of politicisation 
The dilemma of politicisation is present in the day-to-day practices in the civil 
service. However, there is a distinction between the different work tasks in the 
administration and different opinions whether these work-tasks may be legiti-
mately politicalised or not. There are tasks where politicisation only plays a 
small role and the civil servants regard it as highly illegitimate. The civil serv-
ants distinguish between case handling on the one hand and other types of work 
on the other - such as policy development, policy analysis and writing of reports. 
Legality is the most dominant value when respondents are mentioning case han-
dling with direct consequences for citizens. Politicisation in these types of cases 
is considered highly illegitimate and neutral competency is the foremost im-
portant value among civil servants. Especially if the out-come of the case han-
dling is settled against the citizen, it is considered highly inappropriate if politi-
cal responsiveness overrules neutral competencies. In cases where the out-come 
of the case handling is an advantage for the citizen, politicisation is still regarded 
as inappropriate, but easier to live with. A civil servant says,  
 
In these cases I would not put my foot down, not even in situations 
where the minister wants us to make a decision without sufficient le-
gal basis. Given that the decision is in favour of the applicant, I 
would not say no. 
 
The distinction between different work tasks, however, does not equals that 
politicisation is completely absent when it comes to case handling. Case han-
dling often implies a high degree of discretion: A civil servant states, 
 
The problems often arise in connection to individual case handling, 
which necessarily must be entrusted to an employee, but where the 
decision at the same time is highly discretionary and involves both 
expert knowledge (not legal skills) and a certain degree of political 
element, and where the decision therefore can be the subject of criti-
cism 
 
Another civil servant also raises the question about politicisation when a specific 
group of people are getting positive attention from the minister and their cases 
are handled with speed compared to other groups without the positive political 
attention. The example mentioned is veterans. The civil servants explains:  
 
Our major daily dilemma when handling cases is the discrimination 
in favour of the citizens who have written personal letters to the min-
ister, as these injured individuals receive extra attention and faster 
decisions at the expense of the other injured persons who have to 






wait longer for a decision in their cases. Besides, cases with political 
interest receive special treatment (e.g. veteran cases), where dispro-
portionate large resources are allocated to their resolving, whereas 
other previous cases in the pile involving equally severe problems are 
being deprioritised. 
 
To sum up, case handling is mentioned as the one work task where political 
responsiveness is considered highly illegitimate if it tempers with neutral compe-
tencies in relation to a decision on a specific case. However, examples shows 
that there are aspects of case handling where politicisation occurs that do not 
relate directly to the decision on the case, but rather relate to the speed of the 
case handling and to cases with a high degree of discretion. When it comes to 
almost all other types of work tasks in the administration, political responsive-
ness is regarded as an intrinsic norm for the civil servant. A civil servant says,  
 
In my opinion, the role of the civil servant is to realise the politics 
and priorities of the minister – in accordance with the law. And not 
be a hindrance with reference to so called ’objective expertise’. 
 
 A civil servant states that he would never participate in an illegal act, but then 
continues:  
 
I would accept assisting in spin, in describing an issue from a special 
angle, even if the text in my opinion is misleading. The responsibility 
for securing a fair and true state of the matter must rely on my supe-
rior and the minister.  
 
Another civil servant states: “politicisation is about presenting data in a positive 
way”. A similar view is expressed when another civil servant says,  
 
Politics has always been about shaping reality in a way that makes 
the sender look good or makes the opponent look bad. And I do not 
think there is anything you can do about it as a civil servant. 
 
 Hence, it appears that functional politicisation is an integrated and accepted part 
of the every-day work life in the state administration among lower ranking civil 
servants. However, it is also important to note that some of the civil servants feel 
the need to emphasise that they have not experienced the dilemma with regard to 
illegal acts. They state that they have never received an illegal order, which 
makes the dilemma regarding illegal acts very hypothetical. The dilemma is 
more subtle and occurs when professional norms are stretched to meet political 
demands. 





Furthermore, it is important to note that it is not possible to opt out on politi-
cisation. A civil servant explains it in this way:  
 
Today it is a matter of fact that ministers and their spin doctors de-
mand solutions that profile the minister in the most beneficial way. 
Consequently, the question you need to ask yourself as a civil servant 
is not whether a solution is undesirable or unsuitable. The question 
you need to ask is whether you want to be an opponent or a team 
player.  
 
Along the same line, a civil servant says 
 
My experience as a civil servant is that you very quickly find your-
self in a ‘bad standing’ situation, if you do not conform to the wishes 
of your superior or the top management in the organization.  
 
Intensified politicisation? 
According to the civil servants, the impossibility to opt out on politicisation is a 
rather new phenomenon. In today’s administration, it seems difficult to refuse to 
contribute to politicisation among the lower ranking civil servants. A civil serv-
ant explains:  
 
15 years ago, when I started in this job, it was accepted that you re-
moved your initials from the case file, if you disagreed with its con-
tent. Today this kind of behaviour would label you as uncooperative 
and inflexible.  
Generally, most of the respondents state that it is extremely difficult to oppose to 
politicisation. Another civil servant also stresses the change in relation to the 
degree of politicisation. He says,  
 
Within the last 10 years professionals increasingly need to develop 
policies, which implies that they need to know the political programs 
of each political Party in the Parliament, they need to promote the 
minister in office, and they need to handle the media.  
 
However, the norm of political responsiveness does by no means mean that the 
norm on neutral competencies is absent in the civil servants’ reflections. On the 
contrary, several respondents reflect on precisely the meaning of professionalism 
in today’s administration. An often-stated argument among the civil servants is 
that a case is seldom “black and white”. The political aspect of an assignment 
(task) is weighed on behalf of professional judgement. Thus, it seems clear that 






the civil servants find it most appropriate to meet the demands of either the min-
ister or a higher-ranking civil servant.  
Nevertheless, how do they act if the demand for political responsiveness 
violates professional norms and the demand for neutral competencies in a way 
that is considered inappropriate or even illegal? We shall now turn to the coping 
strategies among the lower ranking civil servants. 
 
Coping strategies – Handling dilemmas of politicisation 
The three coping strategies, exit, voice and loyalty are all present, although they 
are not equally relevant. First, coping strategy is an exit-strategy, where the civil 
servant chooses to quit his job. If professional norms are violated on behalf of 
political demands that are unacceptable for the civil servant, an option is to quit 
his or her position in the administration. However, this strategy has not been 
followed by any of the participating civil servants, since they were all employed, 
when answering the questionnaires. It appears that they mention this coping 
strategy only in relation to the fact that they experience it as difficult if not im-
possible to ‘put one’s foot down’, and, thus, ‘voice’ as coping strategy. A civil 
servant explains: “As a rule, I will always do what my superior asks me to, be-
cause I don’t want to lose my job”. Thus, this civil servant expresses an anxiety 
of being fired if he or she is refusing to carry out the tasked that he/she is asked 
to do. 
The second coping strategy is the voice strategy, that is to “put one’s foot 
down” – a strategy that seems very difficult to comply with in practice. A civil 
servant says, “To put one’s foot down or choose not to participate is more theo-
ry than practice”. Along the same line, another civil servant says, “Most civil 
servants would consider the action to put one’s foot down and not participate as 
equivalent to start writing your own dismissal notice.” Again, it seems that this 
has changed within recent years. A civil servant explains: When I was younger, I 
clearly stated if I disagreed with the content in a case file and refused to have my 
name on. This is not the case anymore”. In general, it seems necessary to follow 
orders, and thus, act loyally towards your superior. A civil servant puts it this 
way:  
 
My experience is that you cannot do anything but what the manage-
ment has decided must happen. To put one’s foot down is not an op-
tion, since it would result in enormous trouble. 
 
Another civil servant reflects on the culture in the state administration. He says, 
“It is not part of the culture in the state administration to go against the wishes of 
your superior”. 
The reason why it appears to be almost impossible to enact this coping strat-
egy by the lower ranking civil servants may also relate to the fact that it is con-
flicting with another demand towards the civil service: obedience to the political 
leader, in this case the minister. A civil servant says,  






As a rule, you cannot refuse carrying out the task you are instructed 
to. You can say, you do not want to sign the document personally and 
you can journalise a document in the records describing why you do 
not think the decision taken is correct, who you told it to, and what 
their reaction was; if possible with a signature from a colleague. 
 
 To write a note and make sure that it is journalised on the case; seems to be 
the most dominant coping strategy among the civil servants. Written comments 
may include the civil servants reservations regarding the content of the case or it 
may include the direct political order from either the minister or the management 
in the administration. The salient point is that the comment is in writing and may 
be either a written note, a sent or received email. This strategy appears to have 
gained ground among lower ranking civil servants, since it makes sure that they 
can document their own role, if the case later on becomes a scandal. Thus, they 
feel they can protect themselves if the balance tips too much towards the politi-
cal wishes on behalf of the professional norms. 
However, one civil servant is aware that this strategy is a purely individual 
strategy to protect the single employee. He says,  
 
I would always make a written note including my own assessment, 
my recommendations regarding the case, and the direct order from 
my superior and make sure the note appears in the case file. Then we 
can only hope for the management to regard my note as covered by 
the Access to Information Act granting access to public documents, if 
someone requests access to information.  
 
Thus, he is aware that many briefs are left unread in the administration’s records 
unless someone demands the right of access to information. Hence, the “write a 
brief-coping strategy” is a strategy, which solely aims to protect the individual 
civil servant if the neglect of professional norms hits the news media or others 
with the interest in a particular case.  
In the following we will unfold hierarchy as an organisational phenomenon 
with an extreme importance when we want to understand the meaning of politi-
cisation and coping among lower-ranking civil servants. We will especially 
focus on the interplay between voice and loyalty. 
 
Hierarchy 
The organisational hierarchy seems to play an important role when we want to 
understand politicisation among lower ranking civil servants. Several respond-
ents emphasise the hierarchy as a crucial dimension when we want to understand 
politicisation. However, the role of the hierarchy is ambiguous. Some civil serv-
ants describe the hierarchy as something that protects them, where others men-






tion the hierarchy as something that creates an enormous pressure on the lower 
ranking civil servants when it comes to politicisation.  
We begin by looking at the hierarchy as a protective factor. Several civil 
servants emphasise the subordinate relationship that lower ranking civil servants 
have to their superiors, whether the superior is the management or the minister. 
This is the subordination they refer to when accepting a high degree of politicisa-
tion, even if they believe that their professional norms are violated. Thus, loyalty 
may be seen as closely connected to the hierarchical form of organisation. Hier-
archy is enhanced as something that creates legitimacy in the organisation when 
it comes to political decisions, since it is a political organisation where the min-
ister should be in control and civil servants obey. Hierarchy is also seen as a 
protective factor simply because someone above you has accepted the degree of 
politicisation and, thus, may be held responsible for it. A civil servant says,  
 
Since I am employed in a very hierarchical organisation, I fully ac-
cept my superior’s right to make decisions in which I disagree. In 
most cases, I consider my job as well done if I make sure that the rel-
evant arguments and facts are communicated to my superiors in a 
professional justifiable way. 
 
Other civil servants regard hierarchy, not as a protective factor, but as an organi-
sational mechanism that creates an enormous pressure among the lover ranking 
civil servants. A civil servant explains: 
 
Putting one’s foot down in front of your superior require courage and 
a lot of self-confidence, especially because there is often put a lot of 
pressure on your own superior from the top level of the organisation. 
Lower ranking civil servants need to obey; you can raise a slight pro-
fessional concern, but I had rarely experienced that this had any ef-
fect, if the matter is politically high-profiled, and the minister or the 
stakeholders are exerting pressure.  
 
Another civil servant says, “You do not have a strong voice when your position 
is in the bottom of the hierarchy”. And: ”As lower ranking civil servant it is 
extremely difficult to oppose a decision from the top, even if you are a lawyer 
and find a lack of sufficient legal basis.”. As a civil servant, you are supposed to 
follow orders and remain loyal to the political leadership in the organisation. 
Thus, loyalty is a demand, which manifests itself through hierarchy; and this 
demand for loyalty strongly influences voice as a coping strategy. 
The hierarchal form of organisation, thus, contribute to shed light on the fact 
that the coping strategy “to put one’s foot down” is an action considered to have 
no effect at all. A civil servant explains:  
 





will always make a remark to my superior, if there is a potential 
problem in a matter, but because of the hierarchy-based case flow, I 
often experience that such remarks are not passed on and therefore do 
not appear in the final case, and if so, not in a comprehensive form. 
Naturally, the head of office can have his/her own reasons for focus-
ing on special parts of the remarks. Although it often depends on the 
specific people involved, I often experience the mid-level managers 
interpret the technical advice in a way that pleases their superiors and 
is not quite in line with my professional assessment. 
 
Another civil servant describes the hierarchy contrary to what one would think if 
we look at the work of Max Weber, as a system where it is transparent who has 
the responsibility for any decision. Instead, the civil servant describes the hierar-
chy as “a big filter”. He says,  
 
No matter what you write as a specialist, it is altered on the higher 
ranking levels before it is passed to the department. You do not have 
any influence over that. I have also experienced that one of my briefs 
circulated for nearly two years between my specialised unit and our 
responsible assisting general manager. The brief was informing the 
minister that our Agency was not actually acting as promised in the 
explanatory notes to a Bill. The brief has now been shelved. 
 
 Along the same line of argument, another civil servant states:  
 
It is a challenge for me as an expert, when the strict professional as-
sessment from the units are being filtered out as the case moves up in 
the system so that the professional assessment is not even presented 
for the minister and his/her Permanent Secretary. We feel an increas-
ing pressure for presenting cases with an approach, which in our pro-
fessional view is contrary to the aim of the law. Because of the hier-
archical processes for ministerial cases, you risk losing the expert 
knowledge on the way. It is not possible to pass on the professional 
warnings to the final decision makers.” 
 
Several civil servants enhance the management as the main problem if the politi-
cisation is taken too far on behalf of professional norms. A civil servant says,  
 
In my opinion, the management of public organisations is generally 
willing to go very far in order to satisfy the politicians – even though 
the legality and accordance with professional norms are NOT in or-
der. The politicians know too little and deal to little (due to frequent 
substitutions of ministers) with the substantial aspects of their area of 






responsibility. Even though they obviously need to pursue the gov-
ernment policy, it should not be based solely on the need for pleasing 
the industry, the people or interest groups. There ought to be a legal 
and professional basis for decisions, and it is inappropriate that public 
agencies etc. are involved in what is in fact an extended election 
campaign. 
 
In addition, it seems that the demand for political responsiveness comes from 
higher-ranking civil servants and not necessarily from the minister. A civil serv-
ant explains: ”We experience that the pressure towards choosing particular 
solutions often originates from the top of the department, and not from the minis-
ter himself.” Along the same line, another civil servants says,  
 
We never receive so clear statements as described in the presented 
fictitious dilemmas – it happens in a much more disguised end subtle 
way. Everyone tries to guess/interpret what the wishes of the minister 
are, consequently, there is no need for neither the minister or the 
Permanent Secretary to declare explicitly the desired result. If, how-
ever, the desired result (which you have to anticipate) is not provided, 
it is instantly criticised. 
 
The demand for political responsiveness is experienced as a pressure. A civil 
servant says, ”The end station of the pressure is the bottom of the hierarchy”. 
Thus, the hierarchical structure is important. A civil servant says, “In most cas-
es, you have to obey because we work in a strict hierarchy with top-down man-
agement.” And he continues,  
 
Basically, a civil servant only have the option of calling attention to 
potential concerns. If these concerns are not taken into account you 
simply need to keep up appearances or quit the job, not necessarily 
immediately but over a period of time. You do definitely not win 
points by stating that a specific decision is not possible or does not 
have sufficient legal basis or conflict with central administrative law 
principles. Whereas I many years ago acted in a legally based and bu-
reaucratic civil service, we are now working in a very political and 
solution-oriented environment, where legal considerations are not 
any longer a natural prerequisite, but rather seen as a disturbing and 
formalistic element. 
 
Thus, the role of the hierarchy is described as somewhat ambiguous. Some see 
hierarchy as a mechanism that ensures accountability; others experience the 
hierarchy as a filter. Some see hierarchy as protective of lower ranking civil 
servants; others see it as the main mechanism creating pressure among the lower 





ranking civil servants. The latter also questions whether the management is held 
responsible in case of a political scandal. A civil servant says, “The cases are 
subject to major revisions; however, you are still registered as the responsible 
civil servant in the records”.  
Another civil servant explains that being a lawyer in the ministries can be 
hard. He says,  
 
I experience, however, that my profession is in a somewhat bad 
standing. There seems to be a common understanding of the lawyers 
being the reactionary guys, who always says ‘no’ and who are not 
able to take politics in to account. My colleagues and I are actually 
very frustrated and often talk about these issues, when our non-legal 
superiors are not present. However, it is a difficult balancing act, 
while it is always the lawyers who are put under pressure in order to 
distort the EU law and compromise on the Constitution, when a polit-
ical initiative has to be promoted. How do you for instance answer 
your superior, when he/her for the third time states that it is not a 
question of whether a certain initiative can be realised, but rather how 
to arrange it? 
 
Discussion 
Functional politicisation is part of every-day life in Danish state administration. 
Government policy is present in every task carried out by the civil servants and 
is regarded as an integrated part of the work life in a modern bureaucracy. Thus, 
civil servants describe politics as something that permeates the organisational 
culture in the entire state administration and it is, thus, impossible to escape 
politicisation. This is noteworthy the case in spite of the fact that we specifically 
concentrate on statements from lower-ranking civil servants. Thus, the intermix-
ture of politics and administration is not reserved to the top layers of the civil 
service; on the contrary, it seems to be a fundamental working condition even in 
the outermost positions of the administration.  
Only when it comes to specific case handling, politicisation is regarded as il-
legitimate. Civil servants, however, describe how politicisation may occur even 
in these type of cases, through political motivated discriminatory practice (or 
differential treatment), for example when a certain type of cases is prioritized 
and, consequently, handled before other cases without political attention. 
Spin is seen as unavoidable, which is, shaping and presenting the facts in a 
way that is favourable for the minister. Some even characterise this part of the 
job as profiling or branding the minister.  
Some civil servants perceive politicisation as unproblematic and feel pro-
tected by the hierarchical structure in the state administration. They acknowledge 
that politicisation is part of the every-day life in the administration, but do not 
feel adversely affected by it, since superior civil servants are the ones that take 






on the entire responsibility for the work carried out. In this way, some of the 
civil servants use hierarchy in their internal justification as a coping strategy. 
However, other civil servants experience that politicisation puts pressure on 
their neutral competence, and feel that government policy is too large a part of 
the work carried out. Still, the voice coping strategy is not experienced as a rele-
vant coping strategy, at least not in the literal meaning of the word. Firstly, to put 
ones foot down is regarded as equivalent to not doing your job. Some civil serv-
ants describe politicisation as an integral part of the job in the central govern-
ment and, it, thus, seems impossible to say no. Secondly, to put ones foot down, 
would create too much of a hassle. Thirdly, to put ones foot down seems mean-
ingless, since it is believed to have no effect on the practices in the administra-
tion. Civil servants describe the hierarchical structures as a filter that discards 
any critical comments or reservations. Often, critical comments get no further 
than the head of office-level in the hierarchical structure. Else, the top manage-
ment discards critical comments. In either way, critical comments do not reach 
the minister. Consequently, the civil servants feel that they are left with only two 
possible coping strategies. Either you can use an exit strategy in the sense that 
you can quit your job or you can leave a written note in the case file stating the 
reservations you may have as a civil servant.  
This last mentioned strategy, leaving a written note in the case file, can be 
characterised as a sort of life insurance of the individual civil servant at risk of 
being accused of maladministration later. You could argue that this is also a 
coping strategy in the form of voicing, even though the reservations and con-
cerns are not actually communicated, and most likely will remain unknown. 
After all, the civil servant does not obey just like that but feel so uncomfortable 
with the situation that he/she produces a written note. However, seen through 
Hirschman’s theoretical lens, there is an interesting difference between the two 
situations, which we need to emphasise. Hence, voicing in the form of only pro-
ducing a written note is apparently not functioning as a way of hindering mal-
administration or even illegal actions. Not even does this kind of coping strategy 
call attention to a potential danger for the superiors or the organisation as such. 
The fact, that it seems meaningless ‘to put ones foot down’ or ‘say no’, sug-
gests that a more classical perception of “voicing” is not seen as relevant because 
of the strong hierarchies and an intensified politicisation. This also challenges a 
common belief associated with the merit-bureaucracy. In a merit bureaucracy 
like the Danish, formal politicisation is absent and politicisation is functional. 
However, functional politicisation should be linked to the possibility for the civil 
servant to say no or put his foot down if professional competences are violated, 
which is also stated in the newly published Danish Codex on civil servant norms. 
To ensure democratic legitimacy, the loyalty of the permanent civil service 
should reflect a ‘constrained partisanship’ meaning that civil servants should not 
deliver pure partisan advice (Husted & Salomonsen, 2014: 750). 
Thus, it is arguable that functional politicisation is necessary and part of a 
legitimate democratic, political system (Mulgan, 2008). However, if professional 
competences are systematically neglected on behalf of political considerations, it 





undermines the legitimacy of the political system. The civil servants describe 
how politicisation is permeating the entire state administration and several of the 
civil servants feel that the political aspects of case handling have overruled neu-
tral competency and professional competency. 
 
Conclusion 
The empirical material suggests that it is far easier to depress the pedal than to 
pull the brake. These conditions may be problematic, since it is a prerequisite to 
the functional politicisation in a merit-bureaucracy that the civil service is able to 
pull the break. The integrated advice means that the civil service must ensure 
both political responsiveness and ensure professional standards, legality, and 
truthfulness.  
Moreover, these findings also question the applicability of the codex VII as 
an effective lifeline in dilemma situations. As already mentioned, it is a recurring 
point of the codex that the civil servants are obliged to put their foot down and 
say no, if they are ordered by their superior to carry out unlawful actions or dis-
seminate incorrect information, at least if the unlawfulness seems to be obvious. 
Accordingly, the response categories of the survey operate with precisely this 
focal point: The responding civil servants were asked if they would assist in the 
problematic action by choosing one out of four alternatives; a) Yes, without 
reservations b) Yes, but I’ll raise my concerns/reservations to my superior c) 
Only after a direct order, and I’ll in definite terms warn my superior d) No, I’ll 
definitely put my foot down and refuse to assist. 
However, our analysis suggest that these are not perceived as relevant strat-
egies for the lower ranking civil servants. This is not so, because the civil serv-
ants need to learn or refresh the norms outlined in the codex, but because the 
hierarchy and the functional politicisation mechanisms are perceived as too sub-
stantial. 
Hence, our study suggests that we need to study mechanisms of functional 
politicisation much more carefully – also at the lower levels in the organisational 
hierarchy. Furthermore, our study proposes that hierarchy as organisational form 
holds the key to understanding the complexity of mechanisms of functional 
politicisation in moderns merit-based bureaucracies. 
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